Observing bailout expectations during a total eclipse of the sun
Introduction
Bailouts have been accused to foster a double-sided moral hazard 1 . On the one hand, by bailing out a country, International Financial Institutions provide incentives to sovereign debtors to default instead of initiating politically costly macroeconomic reforms. On the other hand, creditor moral hazard arises when bondholders lend too favorably to risky borrowers because they expect a third party to bail them out. Even though a large literature has discussed the theoretical impacts of bailouts, empirical evidence is hard to assess (Rogoff, 2002) .
Dreher (2004) reviews the stylized facts which could relate IMF interventions and moral hazard. Testable consequences of such link proposed in the literature include bond spreads decrease in level (Eichengreen and Mody, 2000; Lane and Philips, 2000; Kamin, 2004; Noy, 2004; Dell'Ariccia et al., 2006) or in variability (Dell'Ariccia et al., 2006) , longer term and/or cheaper funds flow to emerging markets (Mina and Martinez-Vasquez, 2002; Kamin, 2004) , slower bond reaction to changes in fundamentals (Kamin, 2004 , Dell'Ariccia et al., 2006 , Lee and Shin, 2008 .
Unfortunately, empirical results heavily rest upon the econometric approach adopted and no consensus has been reached so far by the profession on the existence of a moral hazard effect. Lane and Phillips (2000) analyze bond spread reactions to events which should drive bailout expectations and find very little signs of creditor moral hazard. Only in one case do they detect a significant effect: the 1998 Russian default. According to Kamin (2004) , prior to 1995 the nature of the IMF interventions could not lead to creditor moral hazard, and afterwards evidence is scarce.
Other authors, however, argue in favor of a strong creditor moral hazard effect. Dell'Ariccia et al. (2006) analyze bond spreads across emerging countries. According to their view, the non-intervention in Russia in 1998 represented a notable change in the IMF policy which influenced significantly bailout expectations. Empirical evidence is provided through a larger dispersion in the spread series to be attributed to a reduction in bailout expectations associated to the fundamentals becoming more relevant in bond valuation. Dell'Ariccia et al. (2006) conclude in favour of the existence of creditor moral hazard prior to 1998. In the same spirit, Lee and Shin (2008) show that when bailout probabilities differ across countries, expectations of the IMF lending lowers the relationship between fundamentals and bond spreads. This effect, attributed to moral hazard, is observed even after the 1998 Russian non bailout.
As a matter of fact, the empirical studies face a serious identification problem. Indeed, in bond prices series, bailout expectations interact with several other influences and no satisfactory method has been put forward yet for disentangling them. consequence, the correlation between the cross-listed returns of the same bond falls dramatically when investors from one market only, do expect to be bailed out. Furthermore, the interaction between the segmented markets tends to disappear, each one reacting mostly to local innovations.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the markets organization during WWI leading to the arbitrage impossibility. Section 3 presents the original database and tests for the difference between the Russian bond prices in Paris and in London, first on the complete noarbitrage period, then on the two sub-periods lying respectively before and after the repudiation announcement. Section 4 presents the impact of bailout expectations on the bond price dynamics. Section 5 concludes.
The French and British bourses during WWI
The no-arbitrage argument is a pillar of financial valuation techniques. According to this principle, cross-listed bonds should have the same value on all markets, ignoring market microstructure distortions and transaction costs. Up to the outbreak of WWI, international arbitrage took regularly place between exchanges and prices from one financial market were closely followed on the others. WWI had a dramatic impact on the functioning of the stock exchanges both in France and in Great-Britain. In order to avoid panic, the regulatory authorities first suspended stock exchanges' activities and the London Stock Exchange closed 
Data series and historical background
During the 19 th and early 20 th centuries, the Russian tsarist bonds were spread over several Amsterdam (Freymond, 1995 Nevertheless, despite the repudiation, both prices remain extremely high for such low-quality bonds with standard coupon rates. Landon-Lane and Oosterlinck (2006) Bailout expectations remain the only credible explanation for the price difference between Paris and London, suggesting that the French bondholders had higher hopes to be bailed out than the British ones. Indeed, the absence of arbitrage leading to the segmentation of the two markets made it possible for governments to favor their homeland investors. In a way, the 
Bailout expectations and bond prices dynamics
The mean test results (Table 2) indicate that market segmentation at work on the whole observation period does not suffice to explain the differences in Paris and London bond prices. That is, prices only began to diverge after the repudiation. The importance of creditor moral hazard is however not constant over time. R t is the daily return and P t is the bond price. Returns are also useful since they are less sticky than raw prices. Therefore, they better reflect how the valuation process reacts to shocks or innovations affecting markets. Returns are plotted in figure 3 and Table 4 provides their descriptive statistics. Before the repudiation returns in Paris and London are almost the same. For this period, Russian bonds exhibit more volatility as well as more extreme minimum and maximum values on the French market. After the repudiation however, the returns on the French market are higher than those in London. The maximum return is still observed in Paris but the minimum return is now to be found in London.
Correlations between Paris and London returns are found to be of 0.56 and 0.12, before and after the repudiation respectively. After the repudiation, the correlation is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that the French and London markets acted independently from one another. This significant drop in the correlation is confirmed by a simple t-test, which rejects, at the 1% level of confidence, the null hypothesis that both sub-periods prices returns correlations are equal 20 . Overall, the examination of correlations provides interesting evidence that the series dynamics was significantly altered by the repudiation and, more specifically, that series joint movements became less pronounced.
This result can be evaluated in a more formal way using a standard VAR analysis (Sims, 1980) . We use a VAR(1) specification for the bond prices returns, both in Paris and London 21 .
VAR models are useful to examine co-movements of two or more endogenous variables. In our case, the approach is convenient to examine how French and British bond prices returns were affected by common shocks before and after the repudiation. Our two-variables VAR (1) specification takes the following form: To determine the impact of the repudiation on the returns dynamics, we estimate model (1) for each sub-period. The impulse response functions 22 , represented in Figures 3 and 4 , allow assessing the impact on returns of a temporary shock (of one standard deviation magnitude) affecting either Paris or London at time 1 t = . On each market before the repudiation, no 20 The same conclusion is drawn from tests based on raw bond prices. 21 Information criterions suggest that a higher order VAR is not relevant to our purpose. 22 Impulse response functions are obtained using generalized impulses (Pesaran and Shin, 1998). significant difference is observed between the reaction patterns to shocks impacting one market or the other. In both cases, a contemporaneous positive effect progressively disappears after 4 to 5 days. In spite of the stronger observed reaction of each market to its own shock, this result indicates a tight link between the Paris and London quotations of the Russian bonds before their repudiation.
After the repudiation, the reactions of both returns to their own innovations remain about the same as before. However, their reactions to the shocks affecting their across-the-Channel counterpart changed dramatically. The contemporaneous effect became much weaker (a shock caused a reaction of about 0.1% after the repudiation while the same shock induced a reaction of more than 0.3% before the repudiation) and the maximal effect was reached for a one-day lag. Also, the persistence of shocks slightly augmented since 5 to 6 days were required for the effect of the shock to vanish 23 . These results highlight the weaker cross-reactions of the repudiated bond returns. They support the view that markets significantly diverged after the repudiation and that the bond valuation process became mainly domestic. As a matter of fact, prices were higher in Paris, translating higher bailout expectations from the French investors.
We now turn to the variance decomposition analysis, which determines the share of the total variance of a given series explained by the other one within the VAR framework. Results are reported in Tables 5 and 6 for both sub-periods and for different time horizons. Interestingly, before the repudiation, shocks occurring on the other market consistently represent about 30% of the total variance while, after the repudiation, this share drop to less than 5%. This, again, can be interpreted as a deep modification of the underlying dynamics of the series after the repudiation.
Before the repudiation, returns in Paris and London tend to move in similar way: correlation is relatively high and the bond returns react strongly to innovations from the other side of the Channel. After the repudiation however, returns show a marked difference. Correlation drops to 12% and returns almost only react to shocks occurring on their home market. Comovements from the pre-repudiation period are due to the common Russian fundamentals (macroeconomic variables, but also the civil war events). After the repudiation, comovements are much smaller. This does not necessarily imply that bondholders where no more paying attention to fundamentals. Oosterlinck and Landon-Lane (2006) In presence of bailout expectations, fundamentals are analyzed by the markets in a different way. In London, positive news linked to the fundamentals should be translated in a positive return. For example a statement made by the Soviet that they would repay part of the debt should increase Russian bond prices in London. In Paris however, this need not be true because the bond value stems from two components: one linked to fundamentals, the other to bailout expectations 24 . These components could well be negatively correlated. Therefore, the same statement might increase the fundamental bond value and decrease its bailout component. Providing that bondholders believe that the likelihood of a French bailout is severely diminished whereas probabilities to get repaid by the Soviets only marginally increases, one would observe a decline on bond prices following the statement.
Since bond prices react to local innovations, one could argue that fundamentals play a lesser role in presence of creditor moral hazard. This idea had already been suggested by Kamin (2004) , Dell'Ariccia et al., (2006) and Lee and Shin (2008) . This paper provides additional insights in the mechanism at play. One could argue that fundamentals are still central for bond valuation but that the existence of bailout opportunities leads bondholders to analyze fundamentals in a different way. More precisely, the interaction between fundamentals and bailout expectations becomes central: the probability of a reimbursement by the issuer and the probability to be bailed out are indeed linked. Bond prices are in fact influenced by the correlation between these probabilities.
Conclusion
IMF bailouts have been accused to create moral hazard. Despite a large literature related to creditors' moral hazard, there is no consensus regarding its existence, let alone its importance.
Based on a unique historical episode, this paper compares the prices of the same defaulted bond traded on two segmented markets (Paris and London, during WWI). In Paris, bondholders were expecting a bail out while in London no such hope was ever mentioned.
The market segmentation, imposed by the war, guarantees that all observed price differences are due to bail out expectations.
Our analysis confirms that the French bailout expectations played a major role in the bond valuation. On average, these expectations lead the prices of a similar bond to exhibit a 6% relative difference between the two markets after repudiation. However, this mean effect hides deeper changes in the dynamics of the series, as captured by the impulse response functions which exhibit a sharp fall of the mutual influences. Empirical results point in favor of the theory proposed by Kamin (2004) , Dell'Ariccia et al., (2006) and Lee and Shin (2008) according to which bailout expectations modify the investors' perception of the fundamentals.
The paper provides additional insights in the way changes in perception affect bond prices.
When bailout is expected, the bondholders hold a virtual portfolio made of two different securities: one bond reacting to fundamentals and a (derivative) asset representing bailout opportunities. This portfolio value depends on the correlation of these two securities. In other words, not only does the existence of a potential bailout play a role, but also the interplay between probabilities of being bailed out and changes in fundamentals.
Even though the data used in this paper come from a time where the IMF did not exist, the message they bring is topical: bailout do create creditors' moral hazard. In fact, studying bailout expectations before the IMF and its macroeconomic restructuring plans make it easier isolating the effects of creditor moral hazard. The potential bailouts considered in this paper were motivated by the investors' government political agenda, not by any international concern. Whether such behavior could take place again in our modern economic world is questionable. At best, its occurrence should require the conjunction of political circumstances as least as rare as a total eclipse of the sun. 
